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BOOK REVIEW
FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. V.

IBM. Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan and Joen E. Greenwood.
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 1983. $27.50 (cloth).
Regulation of strategic behavior by a dominant firm poses difficult problems for antitrust courts and policymakers. The problems
are particularly acute if the market involved is dynamic, involving
not only price competition but other dimensions such as product
innovation. The government's gigantic Sherman Act monopolization case against IBM and the companion private cases highlight the
issues concerning strategic behavior in their classic form. The effect
of these cases on antitrust law has been profound. One commentator suggests that the IBM cases have transformed antitrust law.' A
finding of monopoly power now requires more than a demonstration of strategic behavior intended to create or maintain such
power. Instead, if conduct is to form the basis of a monopolization
charge, the government must prove the conduct is not competition
on the merits.
How did the IBM cases create such a profound reaction? What
economic arguments did the plaintiffs and IBM make? Was the effort to regulate the conduct of IBM "without merit?" 2 Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated. Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM by Franklin M.
Fisher, John J. McGowan and Joen E. Greenwood seeks to answer
these questions. The authors, who were members of the team of
economists that testified for IBM, present a detailed review of the
litigation position of IBM.3 Fisher and his colleagues 4 conclude that
1
Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases and the Transformation of
the Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 587 (1982).
2 See F. FISHERJ. MCGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. .IBM 368-69 (1983) (reproduction of the stipulation filed
with the court stating that the case was "without merit"). In addition to dismissing the
case and acquiescing in the stipulation, Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter
wrote a memorandum informing the Attorney General of the dismissal. See Sullivan,
supra note 1, at 639-43. Rather than a complete apologia of IBM, Baxter's memorandum
states that IBM may have had monopoly power in a segment of the computer market and
that some of IBM's alleged "bad acts" may have occurred in the manner and with the
intent alleged. In the face of these conclusions, Baxter decided to dismiss the case because (I) the law within the Second Circuit was unfavorable; (2) the most convincing
evidence against IBM resulted in a substantial monetary settlement by IBM; (3) trial
errors might result in a reversal of any government victory; and (4) no sensible relief was
available to the government.
3 Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated was derived largely from Fisher's direct testimony
for IBM and is primarily an analytic work. Franklin Fisher also coauthored a book which
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IBM did not have monopoly power in the data processing industry
and that its conduct was a legitimate response to the dynamic nature
of competition in that marketplace.
The book amounts to a classic "Harvard School" industry
study. 5 It traces the history of the data processing industry, describes the competitive strategies of firms, and assesses the state of
competition within the industry. Litigation made available to Fisher
a wealth of data not normally accessible to an academic economist.
As a consequence, the book provides the reader with a ring-side seat
to thirty years of tumult in perhaps the most dynamic industry in the
United States. For that reason alone, the book is worth reading. In
addition, Fisher includes a concise, finely executed twenty-page theoretical description of antitrust economics. 6 This section provides
the nonmathematical lawyer with a valuable description of the role
of market definition and an analysis of market conduct in monopolization cases. Fisher warns the reader that static economic models
often obscure the nature of competition in the real world. Markets
often may be in disequilibrium and, in these markets, the use of
static models is quite misleading. Profits derived from market disequilibrium are not monopoly profits. 7 Moreover, the presence of
such profits drives investment in the right direction and this new
investment creates entry (and falling prices which should not be
misidentified as predatory pricing). Those of us who teach introductory antitrust law courses and struggle with explaining to nonis a companion volume to Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated. See F. FISHER, J. MCKIE & R.

IBM AND THE U.S. DATA PROCESSING INDUSTRY (1983). This companion work,
derived from ajointly authored piece of trial testimony in U.S. v. IBM, DX 14,971 ("the
Historical Narrative"), presents a chronology of the development of the computer industry. Although there is some repetition between the two books, the historical narrative enriches a full understanding of the analytic work.
4 Although the two books are ajoint effort of Fisher and many of his colleagues at
the Charles River Associates, the authors will be referred to collectively as Fisher for the
convenience of the reader.
5 See, e.g., F. SHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1-7 (2d ed. 1980) (introduction to type of industrial organization analysis created
by Harvard Business School professors). Furthermore, Carl Kaysen, dean of the
MANKE,

Harvard school economists, wrote the preface to Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated. Kaysen

points out Fisher's intellectual debt to Edward Mason and the tradition of industry studies based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.
6 F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN & J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 19-41. Fisher notes
that competition among firms has a variety of elements: price, product quality, service,
innovations in product and production. According to Fisher, a proper assessment of the
state of competition in any market must consider all these elements.
7 See id. at 219-64. Fisher presents a useful discussion of the theoretical difficulties
in using accounting profits as an indication of monopoly profits and persuasively critiques the government's attempt to prove IBM had market power because of the firm's
rate of return. Fisher concedes, however, that IBM was a highly profitable firm. The
reader ultimately must guess whether IBM's profit level, if properly calculated, would
help to determine its market power.
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economists the static models of pure competition and pure monopoly would do well to add Fisher's description of more dynamic markets as a needed antidote to our more conventional descriptions.
In addition to its theoretical explanations, Fisher's book provides the reader with an explanation of why IBM has been so successful in innovation competition, which has been the driving force
of the computer industry.8 Fisher leaves the reader with the impression that IBM's success in innovation competition is a combination
of good science, good management, and good luck. IBM has devoted considerable resources to developing leading edge technology. Fisher points out that IBM's innovations extend not only to its
products, but also to its methods of manufacturing. Fisher also recognizes that IBM is a world class marketer whose great strength has
been in bringing its technological improvements to market as successful commercial products. Fisher also lists several instances
where luck has had a role in IBM's success. 9 For example, IBM originally developed high quality printers to support its older punch
card business. This gave IBM a significant competitive advantage in
the late 1950s when printer technology became important in the
computer industry. 10
Fisher's main task, however, is neither historical nor theoretical.
The major portion of the book attempts to substantiate Fisher's assertion that the government's case against IBM did not involve mere
errors of judgment about which reasonable policymakers could differ, but rather that the case was one which no reasonable economist
could support." This Essay reviews that conclusion.
For the government, the IBM case was a disaster. The Antitrust
Division devoted substantial resources to the case over a period of
many years.' 2 Nevertheless, no systematic, critical, top-level review
of the legal and factual premises of the case occurred until late in
the Carter administration. That review ultimately lead the Division
13
to dismiss the case, concluding that any further effort was futile.
8
9
10

Id. at5-11.
Id.

Industry structures in part may reflect random (stochastic) growth patterns,
which lead to concentration in some markets. See F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 145-50
(discussion of this process).
11 See, e.g., F. FisHERJ. McGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 1, 96,130, 218
& 258.
12 The record in the case amounted to over 100,000 pages of trial transcript;
thousands of documents were introduced at trial. Upon dismissal, 13 years after its fi1ing, the case was several years from a definitive conclusion.
13 See supra note 2 (describing reasons for dismissal). A lengthy European Economic Community proceeding under article 86 of the Treaty of Rome considered many
of the practices underlying the government's case against IBM. The EEC action was
predicated on IBM's failure to give sufficient lead time and data with respect to peripheral interface information and IBM's practice of bundling memory and systems software
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As a participant in the early stages of the review, I read some
10,000 pages of the trial transcript, hundreds of trial exhibits, and
intensively discussed the case with members of the trial team.
In many ways, the case demonstrated all that can go wrong with
complex antitrust litigation. The government and the court never
consolidated or refined the legal issues or the factual disputes. As a
consequence, discovery ran amok and at trial, the parties wrangled
over issues not central to the litigation and factual disputes that
should have been the subject of stipulations. Nevertheless, the government's case, at its core, was a conventional piece of antitrust litigation. The government claimed that IBM had monopoly market
power in large mainframe computers optimized for a wide range of
business purposes, and that at least part of that power resulted from
acts that were not acts of skill, industry, or foresight. Fisher attempts to convince the reader that the government's case was fundamentally flawed on both of these issues.
I will review two areas in some detail to test Fisher's proposition. Was the government's attempt to define a relevant market and
measure IBM's power in the defined market at all reasonable? Were
any of the bad acts the government alleged arguably anticompetitive? To examine the latter area of the case I will focus on the
"fighting machine" evidence. My purpose is not to prove that the
government should have persisted in prosecuting the case or to
prove that had it done so it would have ultimately prevailed.
Rather, my goal is more limited: to examine the question of
whether under accepted antitrust doctrine, fair grounds existed for
litigating the positions the government adopted.
I
MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER ISSUES

The government's approach to the issue of whether IBM monopolized any market followed conventional antitrust outlines. The
government tried to define a relevant market and then assess IBM's
power in that market primarily by reference to its share in the dewith the price of the CPU. In addition, the EEC challenged IBM's refusal to provide
certain types of software for use on non-IBM CPUs.
Article 86 prohibits abuse of a dominant position within a relevant product market;
the provision is analogous to § 2 of the Sherman Act. For a general description of the
development of article 86, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS

578-75, 593-97 (2d ed. 1984). In August 1984, the EEC and IBM settled the article 86
action. The settlement provides that IBM will offer the system 370 CPUs on an unbundied basis within the EEC. IBM also must disclose certain technical data on interfacing
with the system 370 units and with the systems network architecture, allowing communication among computer systems. For a description of the settlement and its potential
business importance, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
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fined market.1 4 Fisher's theoretical approach to measuring market
power differs from the usual antitrust model. Fisher suggests that
the process of defining a market is not an end in itself, but rather is
only a useful and convenient "analytic expository device."' 5 According to Fisher, the real question is how constrained a firm is in its
pricing, output and other competitive decisions. This question may
be obscured by the bright line legal decisionmaking process that determines whether a particular product is "in" or "out" of the market. If a market definition places near substitutes outside the
market, the definition might not be "wrong" but it will overstate the
market shares of included firms. Thus, as a matter of theory, Fisher
gives much less weight to market shares as a measure of market
16
power than do antitrust judges.
In practice, the differences between the conventional model
and Fisher's approach are not dramatic. If the definition of the market reflects all real demand and supply substitutes, market share
analysis does tell the factfinder something significant about market
power, particularly if the analysis considers barriers to entry. Demand substitutes are products seen by purchasers as reasonable
economic substitutes. Supply substitutes describe the production
capacity of rivals which could be diverted to production of the product in question if present producers attempted to exercise monopoly power. Barriers to entry reflect the ease of converting or
producing new capacity in the industry. The presence of demand
and supply substitutes and the conditions of entry constrain the
market power of producers.17 The reliance of courts on market
share within this framework reflects a sensible concern for judicial
administrability. After a court reaches a reasonable market definition, relying almost exclusively on market share (shaded by an analysis of barriers to entry) to determine market power simplifies
decisionmaking by limiting the number of factors under consideration. The court identifies firms that meaningfully affect competitive
conditions and measures power only with regard to those actors.
Moreover, the approach does not create a substantial risk of errone14
See. e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp ., 384 U.S. 563 (1963); United States v.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Aluminum Co.of
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (all three cases use traditional antitrust model of
review)'.
15 F. FISHERJ. MCGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 43.

16

Id. at 43-46 & 99-100.

TheJustice Department has adopted this approach to market definition. Department of Justice Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982), reprinted in Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterword, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 632, 649
(1983). The guidelines were produced while William Baxter was in charge of the Antitrust Division.
17
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ous decisions as long as the court identifies the proper demand and
supply substitutes.
The bulk of Fisher's analysis attempts to prove that both demand and supply substitutes significantly constrained IBM's competitive strategies, and that as a consequence IBM did not have
monopoly power.18 The government contended that IBM monopolized the market for computer systems with multimodal capacity optimized for a wide range of business operations-in short, large
mainframe computers sold for business purposes, the heart of
IBM's business. At trial, the government alleged that only three
other United States companies produced such a product. The government's market definition, however, excluded producers of parts
of mainframe computer systems (plug compatible manufacturers of
peripherals and CPUs ("PCMs")), minicomputer manufacturers, scientific computer manufacturers, service bureaus, and leasing companies. Fisher argues that these excluded firms restrained IBM and
that any attempt to measure IBM's market power must consider all
such sources of competition.' 9
The government supported its proposed market definition with
internal IBM documents, testimony of industry participants, and expert economic testimony2 0 -evidence that is the traditional grist for
the antitrust mill. Internal IBM documents tracked IBM's competition on the same basis as the government's definition. Industry participants recognized the market as the government defined it.21
18 Out of Folded, Spindled, and Autilated's 352 pages, Fisher devotes 220 pages to
discussing the market definition and market power issues. In contrast, Fisher explicitly
devotes 69 pages to discussing IBM's alleged bad acts. This balance appears to reflect
IBM's trial tactics. If IBM could prove that it did not have market power, the court
would not have to analyze its conduct. Of course, because the market power discussion
includes issues such as barriers to entry, Fisher also critiques the government's attack on
IBM's marketing practices.
19
F. FISHERJ. McGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 60-64; see, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370
(1983); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
aff'dsub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (private cases
supporting broader view of product market involved).
20 Cf. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488,493 (9th Cir. 1977)
(provides some support for government's market definition by stating that "the market
for general purpose computers [could be] distinguishable economically from the market
for ...

other general purpose systems").

21 Fisher's presentation does not discuss much of this information. Fisher discounts, however, the applicability of "the everyday language of businessmen or even
industry reporters" as a reliable guide to market definition. F. FISHERJ. McGOWAN &J.
GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 46. Nevertheless, preexisting documentation used by businesses in making important marketing decisions seems to be the best evidence of actual
competitive conditions in an industry. In addition, the 1982 Justice Department Guidelines attach relevance to practical indicia such as customer perceptions and the Brown
Shoe test. Department of Justice Antitrust Division Merger, Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg.
28,493 (1982), reprinted in Sullivan, supra note 17, at 649.
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IBM, however, presented persuasive evidence supporting its
view of competition within the data processing industry. Fisher cites
examples where systems denominated as commercial were used pri22
marily for scientific purposes and where the opposite occurred.
He notes that in lieu of purchasing new, more powerful systems,
initial system purchasers and customers seeking additions to existing systems purchased non-IBM ("PCM") 2 3 peripherals. Because
peripherals can amount to seventy per cent of the system's cost,
Fisher argues that IBM had to react to PCMs in marketing its own
systems. Fisher makes similar arguments concerning minicomputers. Through networking, a string of minicomputers can perform much of the work of a larger mainframe. Purchasing a
minicomputer might also delay the need to purchase a larger, more
sophisticated system to handle a growing data processing work load.
Fisher also maintains that service bureaus and leasing companies are competitors with system manufacturers. 2 4 Leasing companies serve as intermediaries between manufacturers and the ultimate
user; they purchase equipment from the manufacturer and then
lease it to end users. Because a leasing company may have more
flexibility in arranging financing than a manufacturer and may have
assumptions as to the useful life of the leased equipment, it may
offer a lower rent for equipment than does the manufacturer. A
leasing company may also create a multi-vendor system using lowerpriced PCM peripherals that enable it to create a lower lease price
than that offered by the manufacturer. Further, the leasing firms'
portfolio of existing equipment overhangs the market and might
constrain the prices a seller of new equipment can charge. 25 In addition to leasing companies, computer manufacturers face competition from service bureaus. A service bureau actually controls the
computer and provides the end user with a finished product such as
a completed payroll. Such a service can be an alternative to making
an initial purchase of a computer system or buying a more powerful
6
system. 2
All of Fisher's attacks on the government's market definition
are plausible. Some customers used all of the alternatives Fisher
cites for the reasons Fisher presents. 2 7 The mere presence of
22 F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN & J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 75-76.
23 The government's position, that PCM purchases were used only for system augmentation and not for initial systems, is factually incorrect. Furthermore, it ignores the
possibility that augmentation sales of PCM equipment can affect new system sales.
24 F. FISHERJ. McGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 83-89.
25 Id. at 84. But see Greyhound Computer Corp v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488,493-96
(9th Cir. 1977) (excluding leased equipment from market definition).
26 F. FISHERJ. McGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 86-88.
27 A major difficulty in approaching Folded, Spindled and Mutilated as an independent
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Fisher's alternatives, however, is not determinative. The more important questions are how often users turned to these alternatives,
and whether IBM in fact significantly tempered its competitive response in systems sales because of the presence of this competition.
Even assuming such substitutions occurred, did IBM retain its market power through control of operating systems software and/or
CPUs? 28 These questions show that the issue of market definition is
one of degree. Fisher seems to give all of the modes of performing
data processing equal weight. The government, however, seems to
have given weight to only one method of performing data processing. The opposing litigation positions produced just the type of
"zero-sum" line drawing that Fisher's theoretical discussion deplores. The proposed framework promised a solution to this dilemma. But Fisher's status as an advocate for IBM leaves the reader
without that solution.
Even with an agreed market definition, measuring a firm's market power by market share presents unusual analytic problems in the
computer industry. Difficulties arise because machines are both
sold outright and leased and at the same time new machines go into
service, leases expire and lessees return old machines to the lessor.
Many participants in the computer industry (including IBM) use installed base in measuring market share. This technique reflects a
phenomenon in the computer industry called "software lock-in."
According to this theory, customers purchasing new machines have
a tendency to stay with the same vendor in order to avoid the costs
of rewriting programs. 2 9 Past sales or leases, therefore, are some
work without reference to the historical narrative or other historical information is the
problem of time frame. Consider the example of the minicomputer; products presently
denominated as minicomputers have capabilities that exceed those of earlier generations' mainframes. A mainframe producer today might consider minicomputer prices in
setting its prices. Similarly, IBM now faces more competition from PCM CPUs than it
did in the 1970s. Thus, the government was forced to shoot at a moving target with
respect to market definition. Its arguments had more force when first made than they do
now. In part, the case was dismissed because of fundamental changes in the market
from the time the case was first filed. Without question, IBM faces more competition
today than it did at the time of the CDC incident. Fisher gives a good account of the
innovative nature of the industry. But the reader should not be misled into believing
that the constraints IBM operates under today have always existed to the same extent
that they do now.
28 The government asserted that IBM was able to shift its monopoly profits from
peripherals to CPUs to operating systems as the nature of its competition changed. The
importance of IBM's control of the system software grew with the unbundling of fees for
the use of the operating system. Although Fisher responds to the government's claim
on operating systems, he argues as a matter of fact that IBM never recouped losses on
peripherals with gains on CPUs.
29 F. FiSHER, J. MCGOWAN & J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 123. Fisher believes
that the costs of software conversion are not significant and do not create absolute barriers to entry. Id. at 199-204. The government's position, however, is supported by evidence similar to that cited in Greyhound, 559 F.2d at 495.
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measure of future sales. The government used installed base as its
primary measure of IBM's market position.
Fisher criticizes the government's approach to market share
measurement on several grounds. First, he argues that the installed
base method overstates the status of the early leaders of the industry
by failing to properly account for trends in production capacity or
shipments. 30 Moreover, the method is particularly inaccurate because of the leasing company effect. Installed base includes in a
firm's market share systems sold to leasing companies for which the
firm receives no revenue. These systems, however, constitute actual
or potential competition to that firm. 3 ' Second, Fisher maintains
that the government even failed to measure installed base properly
because it did not reduce the value of older machines still in the
installed base to their present value in the market. 3 2 In sum, Fisher
argues that no single measure of market share accurately reflects
market share in a lease and purchase market. Instead, all potential
measurement techniques (net shipments, total revenue, installed
base at present value, value added) must be considered. Using
these methods, Fisher claims that IBM's market share in the early
1970s was between 33% and 43.4%,33 substantially lower than the
government's claim of a market share in excess of 67%.
Fisher's approach to measuring market share hits the weakest
part of the government's case. The government's approach appears
incomplete and contrived. Installed base is only one of many market share measures, and the government's calculations of this statistic appear incorrect.3 4 Fisher's multivariant approach is much
richer; the comparison of several measures gives a clearer picture of
present competitive conditions and likely trends. Nevertheless,
Fisher's numerical presentations cannot be taken at face value.
They are dependent on his market definition. The reader is left to
guess what IBM's market share would be if Fisher's multivariant approach were applied together with the government's market definition. Fisher's 43% figure, which only represents hardware
production, is closest to the government's market share figure. If
products such as minicomputers are excluded, IBM's market share
might approach the figure used by antitrust courts as an index of
monopoly power. Even though this crucial measurement presuma30
31

32
33

F. FISHER, J. MCGOWAN
Id. at 107-08 & 123.
Id. at 124-27.
Id. at 111-19.

& J.

GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 108.

34
In determining IBM's market share, the government included PCM production
and leasing company machines and failed to discount older machines still in the installed
base. These decisions tended to overstate IBM's market position, particularly in latter
years.
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bly is available, neither the litigation documents nor Fisher's presentation address it.
II
BAD ACTS-THE FIGHTING MACHINE ISSUES

Central to the government's case in its attempt to prove that
IBM abused its market power was I-M's introduction of two products in the 1960s, 35 the series 360/90 scientific "supercomputer"
and the series 360/67 time-sharing computer. The government labeled each of these products "a fighting ship," a product whose primary purpose was not to maximize IBM's short run profits, but
rather to injure IBM's competitors and preserve IBM's market
power.
One of the most significant industrial innovations in American
economic history was IBM's introduction of the series 360 line of
computers in the mid-1960s. 36 The 360 line included a series of
compatible computers providing business with a range of capabilities that significantly advanced the state of the art. The products
were a huge commercial success and are largely responsible even
today for IBM's dominant position in the computer industry. 3 7 The

360 line, however, left open several market niches that IBM's competitors attempted to exploit.
One niche was the scientific supercomputer. Control Data Cor35 The government challenged several other practices of IBM. First, the government claimed that IBM's practice of bundling hardware, software, and service for a single price raised entry barriers. Bundling formed the basis of liability in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S 521
(1954) (per curiam). In the computer industry, however, the practice seemed to result
from customer demand. Customers in the computer industry are buying more than
hardware. They are seeking solutions to particular business problems, i.e., a complete
package. The governmentfactually never linked the bundling practice to IBM's market
power. The government also attacked the IBM practice of giving educational institutions substantial discounts. This practice is supported by national policy as expressed in
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). Another asserted bad act was
IBM's pricing practice with respect to PCM peripherals. The pricing allegations on peripherals formed the core of the unsuccessful private actions against IBM. Although the
government introduced strong evidence of IBM's intent to monopolize the peripherals
business, it never proved that IBM ever priced its peripherals below total cost. Finally,
the government claimed that IBM's changes in the relative price of leasing and purchasing systems represented an act of monopolization. In part this claim formed the basis of
the private action in Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.
1977). The government also asserted that IBM periodically encouraged leasing to increase barriers to entry into the market. Again, however, increased leasing seemed to
result from customer demand. Customers wanted to shift the risk of technological obsolescence to the manufacturer or to use leasing as a way of financing equipment procurement. Without the fighting ship incidents, therefore, the government's case rested on
marginal factual allegations.
36 F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 6.
37 Id.
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poration ("CDC") filled this market segment with its 6600/6700 systems. These CDC products were the most powerful computers then
available. They enjoyed considerable commercial success, making
sales to the leading edge prestige university and government purchasers. 3 8 IBM perceived such accounts as particularly important;
the manufacturer of the industry's most powerful computer gained
considerable sales and promotional advantages and attracted the
best young talent. In addition, development of such a product created innovative techniques that might be used profitably on subse39
quent products.
The CDC supercomputer threat attracted the attention of
IBM's top management. At the direction of the company's chairman, Thomas J. Watson, IBM gave the development of a competing
supercomputer top priority. IBM developed the series 90 computers and began to offer these products to selected customers
when they were at a rather preliminary stage of development. Even
when IBM formally announced the series 90 products, the product
remained virtually untested. As a consequence, IBM's legal and
product test departments did not concur with the product announcement. 40 In addition, the record is unclear as to whether, at
introduction, IBM intended to make a profit with the series 90 product. The government claimed that artificial sales estimates led the
IBM accounting department to conclude that the supercomputer
project would be profitable. The government argued that at realistic sales levels the accounting department would have predicted that
the series 90 project would operate at a net loss.
As commercial products, the series 90 computers were failures. 4 1 Technological difficulties hampered development of a key
integrated circuit, deliveries fell substantially behind schedule, and
sales were low. The only computer in the line that sold in any numbers, the model 91, produced losses in excess of $100,000,000. In
the two years after IBM introduced the series 90 computers, however, CDC also lost money. 4 2 The government claimed CDC's
Id. at 277-79.
Id. at 280.
40 Fisher excuses this action as reflecting the industry norm. Fisher also asserts that
IBM only intended the product test department to play a "devil's advocate" role in the
company.
41
F. FISHERJ. McGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 278.
42
Fisher fails to inform the reader about the CDC loss. He only cites the fact that
from 1965 to 1969 CDC's EDP revenues tripled. Id. at 279. My point is not that a
factfinder would invariably conclude that the CDC losses were the consequence of IBM's
marketing strategy, but rather that Fisher should have included some discussion of the
problem. Another difficult issue that Fisher does not discuss fully is the government's
apparently conflicting claims that scientific computers were outside the systems market
and that IBM's conduct directed at a scientific computer manufacturer was an exertion
38
39
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losses were a consequence of IBM's conduct. CDC also sued IBM,
alleging predatory pricing. IBM settled the CDC suit for an esti4
mated $100,000,000. 3
Fisher argues that the introduction of the series 90 was not a
predatory act. First, he suggests that in measuring profit and loss
from any project, proper accounting methods should consider technological fallout benefits. IBM's accounting system did not recognize such gains. Even without fallout benefits, IBM's witnesses
thought that IBM intended to make a profit on the series 90 project.
Fisher maintains that if technological gains had been included in the
series 90 accounting, IBM's anticipated profit would have been even
greater. Second, Fisher asserts that the series 90 project might have
gone forward in a competitive market with an accounting loss because of the necessity of undertaking the attendant research and development costs. Finally, Fisher suggests that even if the
government claim that IBM's sales projections were unreasonably
high was correct, the competitive harm that CDC suffered as a con44
sequence of the series 90 introduction was not substantial.
Introduction of the series 360/67 time-sharing system presents
a similar fact pattern. In late 1964, General Electric ("GE") offered
an advanced time-sharing system, an important new capability that
allowed a number of users to operate simultaneously on the computer, each user appearing to have access to the capabilities of the
entire system. IBM received considerable pressure from sophisticated users to develop a comparable product. IBM embarked on a
major program to meet the need for advanced time-sharing. By
spring 1965, IBM was bidding a time-sharing product to selected
customers, and in August 1965, it made a full-scale announcement
of the product, again without the approval of the product test
45
department.
Whether IBM intended to make a profit on the model 67 is unclear. Production of this machine certainly displaced production of
46
other machines that were very profitable and heavily backordered.
The model 67 was an undisputed marketing failure. The development of time-sharing software was much more complicated than anof monopoly power over the business systems market. One answer that might link the
two claims is that companies like CDC were the best potential entrants into the business
systems market. This theory also might have buttressed the government's peripherals
case.
43 IBM Chairman, Thomas Watson, wrote on his copy of the CDC complaint that
the charges were not true, except with respect to the model 91.
44 F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN & J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 279-82.
45 Id. at 298.
46 Assuming that sales were deferred and not lost, Fisher argues that the only loss
IBM could have suffered from the fact that other more profitable machines were backordered was a small loss of putative interest on deferred sales. Id. at 281.
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ticipated, and production of the model 67 was delayed. IBM
apparently lost some $80,000,000 on the project and paid substantial damages to selected customers for the product's shortcomings.
Fisher's defense of the marketing of the model 67 is similar to his
defense of the series 90. IBM was responding only to the imperatives of innovation competition. The company anticipated making a
substantial techprofit on model 67 sales and in any event obtained
47
nological fallout benefits from the project.
Whether the series 90 or model 67 incidents constituted antitrust violations raises difficult factual and legal issues which Fisher's
analysis does not completely address. For example, what legal standard should courts apply to new product announcements by firms
with market power? Can inaccurate and premature product announcements be acts of monopolization? In the computer industry,
preannouncement of products is a way of life. Customers may benefit from the practice by being able to plan future purchases with
more reliability. Yet a factfinder might have found that the tale told
here was not wholly the product of accidental misstatement and excusable industry tradition.
In the core area of selling large systems designed primarily for
business use, CDC was a significant potential competitor and GE
was a significant actual competitor of IBM. The government might
have been able to prove that the premature announcement of the
two products in question significantly affected the growth potential
of CDC and GE. Under these circumstances, a legal rule that imposed a special duty on a monopoly with respect to advance product
announcements might be warranted, particularly if the announcements lock actual or potential competitors out of a market. One way
lock-up occurs is when a customer foregoes or delays the purchase
of a competing firm's product and awaits the availability of a comparable product from the dominant firm. Antitrust doctrine places
some restraint on firms with power that other competitors do not
have. Market power, therefore, could justify imposing a higher duty
regarding product announcements on a dominant firm.
Imposition of a legal obligation with respect to product announcements is dependent on a finding of market power and a
nexus between that power and the effect of erroneous preannouncements. Innovation is a process that the antitrust laws should not
hinder. But intentionally (or recklessly) false statements that have
demonstrable anticompetitive effects are not the stuff of skill, industry, or foresight. 48 The sensitive legal problem is to structure a legal
47

Id. at 284-88.

See Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981);
Comment, Innovation Competition: Beyond Telex v. IBM, 28 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1976) (in48
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rule that catches truly anticompetitive conduct without creating disincentives to innovate. Because of the necessity to find some nexus
with the maintenance or creation of market power, preannouncement will rarely have a significant anticompetitive effect reachable
under the antitrust laws. In those instances where it does, however,
a legal rule that inhibits the intentional or reckless use of the pracnovation competition can form basis of § 2 claim). For a contrary view, see Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. CHi. L. REv. 263 (1981). Professor Easterbrook believes that neither pricing strategies nor innovation strategies should give rise
to § 2 liability. The crux of his argument on innovation competition is that "[ajllinnovations involve some short-term sacrifice-the amount invested in research and development. . . . In fact, the most desirable innovations would seem to be the most
predatory, for R&D costs (the sacrifice) and market share (the result) both may be high."
Id. at 306 (emphasis in original). In Professor Easterbrook's view, courts are not competent to determine either the technological reasonableness of the innovation or the net
consumer wealth effects of the strategy. Moreover, allegedly predatory conduct is frequently self-deterring because the claimed predatory strategy is unprofitable. As a result, the legal system should not devote additional resources to regulate conduct that
penalizes itself, particularly when the adopted legal rule might also deter socially beneficial activity. Professor Easterbrook's argument has some force when applied to pricing
suits. The substantial loss attendant with the initial investment in a predatory strategy is
easily measured. This loss must be weighed against the possible gain associated with
future monopoly profit. Modem managerial theory suggests that managers should and
do discount speculative future profits substantially in making investment decisions. If
managers follow this model of decisionmaking in pricing decisions, predatory pricing
should be a relatively infrequent practice.
In my view, however, the Easterbrook argument is incomplete in the context of
computer industry preannouncements. At first blush, in an industry where preannouncement is an important factor in customer decisionmaking, unjustified preannouncement might be thought to operate against self-interest. If a firm develops a
reputation for unreliable preannouncements, rather than holding the market against potential rivals, the strategy should place the perceived illegitimate user of preannouncements at a competitive disadvantage. The problem is that the risk of unjustified
preannouncement by IBM is different for IBM and for its customers. IBM's size allows it
to make mistakes, even substantial ones, and to correct those mistakes over time (if not
for specific customers, then for the community of customers). For other firms, a single
major error with respect to product development may be fatal. Other firms may not
have a variety of different products that allows IBM to diversify its risk. Customers may
believe that IBM's superior size will allow it to experiment with and support marginal
products that a smaller firm would be forced to abandon. Thus, IBM does not stand to
lose as much in customer support as would other firms as a consequence of faulty preannouncement. Moreover, the adverse effect on smaller rivals of holding a relatively small
percentage of its customers by preannouncement might outweigh any potential loss to
IBM.
Finally, consider the psychology of the industry regarding purchasing decisions.
Although computer systems have become crucial to business operations, they remain
peripheral to the main business of the purchaser. The person within a business making
a purchasing decision, therefore, faces a critical choice; the risk to the firm and to that
decisionmaker of a wrong decision is substantial. The purchase of IBM equipment may
not turn out to be optimal, but the down side risk to the purchasing firm and to the
purchasing decisionmaker is smaller than for other purchasing decisions. I suspect that
no EDP manager has ever been fired for buying IBM rather than some other vendor.
Thus size does make a difference. Only for a dominant firm like IBM may unjustified
preannouncement have pernicious effects and only for a firm in IBM's peculiar marketing position may strategic preannouncement be worth the risk.
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tice could benefit competition without significantly reducing the incentive to innovate. The requirement of finding some
anticompetitive intent, which normally would be shown through objective evidence that the preannouncement was unjustified even
considering the risk of delay in new product development, substantially limits the risk that the antitrust laws could be used to reduce
consumer welfare. If, in industries like the computer industry, innovation is a necessary business strategy, innovative behavior would
proceed with this modest legal rule on preannouncement.
Legal issues regarding the series 90 and the model 67 also include what rules courts should adopt with respect to the price-cost
relationships for measuring predatory pricing. The initial factual
question is whether IBM intended to make an accounting profit on
these products. With leading edge products not previously marketed, projecting the costs of development and the number of sales
is tricky business. The circumstances of the introduction of the series 90 and the model 67, IBM's reaction to the CDC suit, and the
customer complaints on the model 67, however, raise at least the
inference that a genuine dispute existed as to what IBM intended to
accomplish with these products. Observers of current antitrust
scholarship know that the proper legal test for predatory pricing is
the subject of an ongoing debate among commentators. Fisher apparently relies only on the Areeda-Turner position to support his
conclusion of innocence. 4 9 The analysis might be different if, instead, a court adopted the Scherer 5° orJoskow-Klevorick 5 1 position
and accepted the government's figures on the reasonable number of
52
anticipated sales.
49 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricingand Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). In a footnote Fisher maintains that the debate

over the proper test for predatory pricing need not be resolved to find IBM innocent.
Yet the text only presents the Areeda-Turner position. F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN & J.
GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 273-76. The debate over the proper test does become crucial if the government's methods of calculating IBM's costs are accepted.
50 See Scherer, PredatoryPricingand the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869
(1976) (proposing full rule of reason analysis for pricing practices of monopoly firm).
51 See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE LJ.
213 (1979) (arguing that pricing patterns of firm should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny if structural conditions conducive to predation exist); see also Sullivan, supra note
1; Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal
Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981).
52 The scientific segment of the market was a particularly attractive area in which to
undertake strategic behavior on price. As a relatively small marketing niche, the costs of
predatory pricing to IBM would be small. IBM would not be sacrificing revenue across
any substantial fraction of its product lines. Yet the demonstration effect of predation
against a potential competitor to IBM in its core businesses such as CDC or other significant potential competitors could be large. Predatory pricing behavior can have two benefits to the predator: its direct effects on the competitors harmed and the establishment
of a credible threat to pursue the same policy against other potential entrants.
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The fighting machine incidents also raise the question of
whether intent should play a role in monopolization litigation. This
53
important issue remains unresolved in antitrust jurisprudence.
Fisher suggests that subjective evidence of exclusionary intent has
almost no role in determining whether particular conduct by a dominant firm should be regulated. 54 The argument is that all firms desire to obtain business from their competitors, and that courts are ill
equipped to distinguish between desirable natural competitive intent and predatory conduct. Thus, Fisher maintains that documents
showing corporate intent are virtually useless unless the defendant's
55
acts themselves are wrongful.
Fisher's view of the judicial process in antitrust litigation is too
narrow. Consider again the issue of predatory pricing in the context
of the series 90 incident. This strategy only makes sense, and therefore is only likely to occur if the predator can recoup its losses by
charging a post-p-edation monopoly price. The ability to charge a
monopoly price depends on the conditions of entry in the target
market. Several commentators have argued that the rules with respect to regulating pricing under section 2 of the Sherman Act
should depend on the measured strength of entry barriers. Yet the
measure of entry barriers is a difficult evidentiary task, subject to
considerable uncertainty and dispute even when limited to only objective economic evidence. In such instances, the best evidence
might be the subjective views of the relevant corporate decisionmakers; they are intimately familiar with market conditions, and
their perceptions and expectations constitute probative evidence of
the reasons behind a marketing strategy and its likely outcome. If
the corporate actors believed that predation was a profitable long
run strategy, courts should consider that belief relevant in determining whether the proper preconditions for predation exist. Similar
arguments make intent relevant to the preannouncement issue.
III
THE FUTURE

An important remaining issue is how to improve the management structures of the Antitrust Division to ensure that its cases
make economic sense and its litigation efforts are efficiently and expeditiously prosecuted. Fisher suggests establishing an Economic
Review Board within the Division that is independent of the trial
53 Compare Sullivan, supra note 1, at 631-37, (intent relevant to analysis of allegedly
214(c) (3d ed. 1981) (suppredatory behavior) with P. AREEDA, ANTrrRuST ANALYSIS
porting Fisher).
54
F. FISHER, J. McGowAN &J. GREENWOOD, supra note 2, at 347.
55 Id.
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staff and the economists preparing cases. This Board routinely and
systematically would consider whether the factual and economic
foundation of an action remains sound. 5 6 Some mechanisms along
that line already exist. The Economic Policy Office, the Office of
Policy Planning, the Evaluation Section, and the Assistant Attorney
General's personal staff all play a review role within the Antitrust
57
Division.
With existing review mechanisms, however, why systematic review of the IBM litigation did not occur until the latter stages of the
Carter administration is mysterious. Changes in the legal environment and the basic conditions of the industry while the case was
pending would seem to have warranted ongoing review. I believe
the answer lies with the senior Divisional managers' perception of
their role. Before filing a case, the Division's managers review in
detail the legal, economic, and factual bases of the case. After filing,
however, review traditionally becomes attenuated. Senior managers
leave tactical trial decisions to the trial staff. This passive model
works well in the conventional price fixing case where discovery is
relatively straightforward and policy questions usually are not
difficult.
The massive monopolization case is a different animal. The
legal, economic, and factual issues are interrelated and very complex. Development of sound policy in this context requires increased involvement by top Division management in the day-to-day
operation of the case. The only way top Division management can
properly supervise an IBM-type case is by maintaining intimate familiarity with a case's legal theories and factual support. Without
this day-to-day effort, the trial staff has an in-house monopoly on
information relevant to litigation decisions. For significant time periods while the IBM case was pending, I sensed that the trial staff
had such a monopoly. Top management was in no position to critically review either the tactics adopted by the trial staff or the staff's
legal theories and factual support. As a consequence, decisions with
respect to what discovery program to undertake, what evidence to
present, and what relief to seek had to be left essentially to the
staff's good judgment.
Fisher's review board would only exacerbate the management
problem; the Division head would have to sit as an appellate judge
with respect to disputed positions. In this context, fundamental erId. at 348-50.
For a formal description of the management structures of the Antitrust Division,
see UNITED STATES DEP'T OFJUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, 114-28 (1979). See also
56

57

WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE ANTITRUST

DIVISION 87-136 (1977) (discussing staff oversight by management).
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rors could be corrected only at great cost. A better approach is consistent active management. Massive monopolization cases raise
issues that are among the most important political questions an administration can face. The administration's political appointees
should be in a position to make informed decisions.
Case management in complex litigation is also the responsibility of the court. Defendants have substantial incentives to delay
such litigation; the stakes for the litigants are enormous. Modern
notions of notice pleading and liberal discovery aggravate the problem. In addition to these incentives, the traditional model of judicial control positions the judge as referee. The scope of the
litigation and its management has been left to the parties. Within
this environment, that the IBM case became an uncontrolled juggernaut is not surprising.
The lesson is that major monopolization cases require a more
active model of judicial control. When an active, informed judge
also becomes responsible for the day-to-day management of a case,
even the most complex matter can be brought efficiently and
promptly to trial. Other cases with active judges, e.g., the government's case against A.T. & T., demonstrate that, at a minimum, the
judiciary can control the resources needed to litigate a major monopolization case.
CONCLUSION

Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated is an important book. It is the only
readily available source which fully sets out IBM's litigation positions in one of the most important antitrust actions ever. The book
is also a significant contribution to the literature on innovation competition. In addition, Fisher presents a unique and useful discussion
of the utility of accounting profits as an indication of monopoly
profits. The major purpose of the book, however, is to show that
the government's effort was totally misguided. In that respect, I believe the book failed. Fisher and his colleagues wear the mantle of
advocates for IBM, pointing out many foibles in the government's
case. But in two key areas, the definition of the market and the analysis of the fighting machines, the discussion does not present the
government's case in its best light. As a consequence, Fisher misses
an opportunity to advance our thinking on the difficult issue raised
by IBM: when should antitrust doctrine prevent a firm with substantial market power from using all the competitive strategies of a
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nondominant firm. The answer to that question remains unresolved
in section 2 litigation.
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